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Although the criminal justice system now strives to  
accommodate defendants with autism, the criminal  
law remains the domain of the ‘reasonable man’ and  
struggles to define culpability in neurodiverse individuals
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ver the past decade, there have been 
considerable strides in recognising the 
issues faced by individuals with a diagnosis 
of autism spectrum disorder (hereinafter ‘autism’). 
Alongside social changes and increased public 
awareness, the criminal justice system has become 
alert to potential challenges inherent in dealing 
with autistic suspects, defendants and witnesses. 
However, the criminal law itself is based on the 
premise of the (neurotypical) ‘reasonable man’ 
and it is argued that this results in the potential for 
inconsistency and injustice. This article considers 
the relevance of autism to the criminal justice 
system, before providing a critique of the current 
legal tests to determine criminal intention and 
culpability (in particular regarding rape), when 
applied to defendants with autism. 
Autism in the criminal justice system
The current diagnostic criteria for autism are 
‘persistent difficulties with social communication 
and social interaction’ and ‘restricted and repetitive 
patterns of behaviours, activities or interests’ (which 
includes sensory behaviour), present since early 
childhood, to the extent that these ‘limit and impair 
everyday functioning’ (DSM-5, 2013). These factors 
in combination, alongside the co-occurring learning 
impairments and mental health issues which many 
autistic individuals present with (Mannion & Leader, 
2013), provide real challenges in determining the 
appropriate level of criminal culpability of individuals 
with autism. There is no evidence that autism itself  
is a causal factor in offending behaviour, but features 
of the condition may predispose some autistic 
individuals to have contact with the criminal justice 
system. These include poor understanding of social 
rules and cues, suggestibility, impulsivity, reduced 
ability to feel empathy, reactive aggression when 
anxious, and an obsessive pursuit of specific interests 
(Woodbury-Smith & Dein, 2014).
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The criminal justice system in England and 
Wales has responded with a range of guidelines 
and best practice recommendations for professionals 
within the criminal justice system, for example, 
toolkits and training for advocates, police and  
the judiciary (Allely, 2015). These developments 
are welcomed, although inconsistencies and gaps 
remain. For example, women and thus female 
suspects and defendants with autism may  
present differently and are underdiagnosed and 
underrepresented in the research (National Autistic 
Society, 2015). Nonetheless, despite progress within 
the criminal justice system, it is the criminal law  
itself which determines whether certain behaviours 
amount to an offence, and there are no specific 
provisions for autism or related neurodevelopmental 
disorders in criminal legislation. However, case law 
such as Gary McKinnon’s high profile battle against 
extradition to face computer hacking charges 
(McKinnon v The United States of America [2008] 
UKHL 59) has highlighted some of the tensions in 
reconciling autism with understandings of criminal 
culpability and punishment.
Mens rea and the ‘reasonable man’
In order to ascribe culpability, the criminal law 
relies on two fundamental elements: the actus reus 
(guilty act) and the mens rea (guilty mind). Although 
there are some exceptions, it is a basic tenet of English 
criminal law that both elements much be present in 
order for a defendant to be guilty of an offence, but  
it is the mens rea which is key, and provides the moral 
justification for punishment (Horder, 2016). The 
definition of mens rea varies greatly, and, depending 
on the offence in question, may be dependent upon 
 a defendant’s intention, recklessness, or occasionally, 
negligence. These categories of mens rea are in turn 
interpreted differently across different offences so 
that, for example, recklessness in criminal damage is 
defined differently to recklessness in manslaughter. 
The result is that a variety of objective, subjective and 
twofold tests operate within the criminal law, in order 
that juries and the judiciary may assess the culpability 
of a defendant’s ‘guilty mind’ against the specific 
criteria for the offence with which they are charged.
Critics have long argued that this renders the 
criminal law irrational and unprincipled, but that 
the ostensible justification for this lack of 
consistency is that it allows justice to be done in 
individual cases (Horder, 2016). However, it is 
argued here that even where a defendant’s 
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subjective state of mind may be considered as 
part of the mens rea, the law’s assumption  
of neurotypical cognitive processes and social 
communication operates against autistic defendants. 
It is an established principle of criminal trials that 
unless a defendant is unfit to stand trial, they are 
considered to be able to function within a normal 
range of cognitive abilities (Horder, 2016). Fitness  
to stand trial is defined as the ability to give, receive 
and understand instructions relating to a criminal 
 trial (Robertson [1968] 1 WLR 1767); a low bar which 
many autistic defendants, even those with moderate 
learning difficulties, will pass. They will thus be judged 
against the criteria of the law’s ‘reasonable man’, 
who is not an ‘ordinary’ man but rather a legal  
fiction, capable of weighing up actions carefully  
and rationally (Moran, 2003).
Mens rea, rape and autistic defendants
By way of an example of how presumptions 
around mens rea may impact differently on autistic 
defendants, it is instructive to consider the mens 
rea of rape. The literature on autism’s relationship 
with offending has identified sexual offending as 
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a potential issue, given the social communication 
inherent in an understanding of consent (Cea, 2014). 
The Sexual Offences Act (2003, s.1) provides that  
in order to be guilty of rape, a defendant must 
intentionally penetrate the complainant’s mouth, 
vagina or anus with his penis, without a reasonable 
belief in the complainant’s consent. Two issues  
arise here: firstly the meaning of an ‘intentional’ 
penetration, and secondly how the law determines  
a defendant’s lack of reasonable belief in consent. 
Regarding the requirement for an intentional 
penetration, it can be argued that impulsivity and  
a lack of understanding of bodily boundaries and 
privacy (Attwood, 2007) could lead to a defendant 
not being able to form the mens rea of intentional 
penetration. Nonetheless, case law to date has 
defined this provision as relating solely to the physical 
act; an understanding of the consequences is 
irrelevant (Ormerod & Laird, 2018).
The second issue is more complex. How can  
we reliably assess an autistic defendant’s culpability 
for an offence whose mens rea is the absence of a 
reasonable belief in another party’s state of mind, 
when it is precisely this lack of understanding of social 
communication and empathy which forms part of  
the diagnostic criteria for autism? Section 1(2) of the 
Sexual Offences Act provides that ‘[w]hether a belief 
is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all 
the circumstances’ and it is this caveat which renders 
the mens rea not wholly objective, which is relevant  
to autistic defendants. Lord Justice Hughes ([2013] 
EWCA Crim 3) gives the example of a situation in 
which reasonableness of a belief could turn on a 
defendant’s ability to read subtle social signals, and 
indeed in Sultan ([2008] EWCA Crim 6) the defendant 
was granted a retrial after evidence of his Asperger’s 
Syndrome had not been considered by the jury in the 
course of his rape trial.
However, the characteristics of a defendant 
which may be considered in the course of establishing 
a reasonable belief are far from settled. A ‘wholly 
irrational’ or ‘delusional’ belief in consent is unlikely  
to be deemed reasonable (Horder, 2016), but the 
 line between an autistic defendant’s obsessive 
compulsions and the jury’s perception of an irrational 
or delusional belief may be a very fine one. Freckelton 
(2012, p. 372) argues that the key to such cases  
is expert evidence about the ‘nexus between  
such conditions and accused persons’ criminal 
responsibility’. Given the wide spectrum of the 
condition, some autistic rape defendants will have  
an adequate understanding of consent; some may, 
depending on the context, and others may have 
extremely limited understanding despite functioning 
well in other respects. The only workable standard of 
‘all the circumstances’ then becomes a subjective  
one, supported by medical evidence. However, this 
was not Parliament’s intention in drafting the law, 
which was expressly intended to achieve a more 
objective mens rea for rape; the appellate courts 
are likely to be presented with further difficult 
cases as a result.
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Conclusion
Despite an increasingly nuanced understanding 
of autism within the criminal justice system, the 
criminal law struggles to apply consistent and 
objective criteria to the criminalisation of autistic 
defendants. As the example of the mens rea for rape 
illustrated, case law has made allowances, but these 
are piecemeal, and subject both to judicial discretion 
and the faith of the jury in expert evidence. It may 
not be possible – nor desirable – to legislate for the 
full range of human responses to situations which 
fall under the remit of the criminal law, but the 
law’s continued reliance on the ‘reasonable man’ 
looks increasingly fragile. 
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